Security

A practical perimeter security checklist for Kenyan sites

Electric fencing, intrusion detection, gates, barriers and surveillance only work as layers. Use this checklist to test whether your perimeter is actually covered.

CCTV camera, access control terminal and vehicle barrier at a modern commercial building entrance.

Perimeter security is the first layer of protection on any site, and the one most often reduced to a single product. A fence, a gate and a few cameras are not a perimeter strategy. Effective protection is built in layers that deter, detect, delay, control and respond — and each layer has to be designed for the site it protects.

This checklist follows the way we assess perimeter requirements at Logitech Consultants. It is not a specification, but it will show you quickly where a site has gaps.

1. Deterrence and the physical boundary

  • Is the boundary clearly defined along its full length, including service roads and drainage lines?

  • Is there electric fencing or another physical deterrent, and is it monitored rather than simply energised?

  • Are gates, pedestrian entrances and vehicle entrances all controlled, or only the main gate?

  • Is security lighting adequate along the boundary and at each access point?

2. Detection

  • Does perimeter intrusion detection cover the whole boundary, or only the sections facing the road?

  • Are alarms monitored somewhere staff actually watch, and is there a documented response?

  • Are intrusion, fence and alarm events visible in the same place as camera coverage?

3. Access control for people and vehicles

  • Are turnstiles, pedestrian gates or door controllers used at staff and visitor entrances?

  • Are visitors and contractors issued credentials that are time-limited and revoked when they leave?

  • Are rising-arm barriers, hydraulic barriers, bollards or road blockers used where a vehicle could be driven at the site?

  • Is under-vehicle inspection needed — airports, government premises, critical infrastructure and high-security facilities often require it?

  • Is ANPR used to identify vehicles, and is it linked to the barrier and the visitor record?

4. Surveillance

  • Does camera coverage follow a plan — approach routes, gates, loading areas, cash or asset areas, and the boundary — rather than wherever a cable was easy to run?

  • Has resolution, lighting and lens choice been matched to the distance being observed?

  • Is recording retention defined, and does storage actually deliver it under real conditions?

  • Is there coverage of the perimeter and the vehicle approach, not only the building interior?

5. Command, control and response

  • Can an operator see cameras, alarms, access events and vehicle activity together?

  • Are there written procedures for what happens when an alarm is triggered, and has anyone tested them?

  • Is there a log of incidents and responses that management can review?

A perimeter is only as strong as its weakest layer. Most incidents exploit the layer nobody designed — the service gate, the blind spot at the corner, the alarm nobody monitors.

Design considerations specific to Kenyan sites

Sites in Kenya bring their own practical constraints, and a design that ignores them will not last. Power interruptions mean the security system needs appropriate backup and, where the operation is continuous, generator support. Dust on external cameras and fences affects detection performance and maintenance intervals. Rain and drainage determine whether cabling and barriers survive the long rains. Poor connectivity in some locations changes what can be monitored centrally.

It is also worth planning for expansion. Many sites add a gate, a warehouse or a second entrance within a few years of commissioning. A perimeter design that leaves capacity in the network, the access control platform and the video management system costs far less to extend than one that has to be rebuilt.

Common mistakes worth avoiding

  • Buying cameras before agreeing what has to be observed and why.

  • Treating perimeter detection as a fence accessory rather than a monitored system.

  • Leaving visitor and contractor credentials active after the engagement ends.

  • Commissioning without testing alarm response, recording retention and failover behaviour.

  • No maintenance plan, so the system degrades quietly over the first two years.

If you want a structured starting point, we can assess an existing site against these layers and produce a requirement that separates what is urgent from what can be phased.